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马布里诉麦迪逊案主审法官（马布里讼麦迪逊案）
发布时间：2023-05-04 14:20:00
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创意岭 阅读：
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大家好！今天让小编来大家介绍下关于马布里诉麦迪逊案主审法官的问题，以下是小编对此问题的归纳整理，让我们一起来看看吧。
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本文目录:
一、马德里诉麦迪逊的意义
马伯里诉麦迪逊一案是美国历史上最重要的案件，对本案的审理给法院确立了一项权力：法院有权决定议会通过的法案或总统行为是否符合宪法，即司法审查原则。
其实凡事都有两面性，虽然因为当时的这件事美国政党闹的不可开交。但是同时因为当时的法官聪敏理智的做法，让美国法律得以重新修改。
因而，现在的美国法律可谓是世纪法律的典范。虽然对当时的美国影响不大，但是对美国未来的发展还是奠定了一定的基础。
二、马伯里诉麦迪逊案英文原文
Marbury v. Madison (1803)（《马伯里诉麦迪逊案》英文稿）（上）
约翰·马歇尔文 发表：选自Info USA/2001年4月；学术交流网/美国历史文献/2002年11月4日转发
Marbury v. Madison (1803)
Just as George Washington helped shape the actual form that the executive branch would take, so the third chief justice, John Marshall, shaped the role that the courts would play.
Under the administrations of Washington and his successor, John Adams, only members of the ruling Federalist Party were appointed to the bench, and under the terms of the Constitution, they held office for life during "good behavior." Thus, when the opposing Republicans won the election of 1800, the Jeffersonians found that while they controlled the presidency and Congress, the Federalists still dominated the judiciary. One of the first acts of the new administration was to repeal the Judiciary Act of 1800, which had created a number of new judgeships. Although President Adams had attempted to fill the vacancies prior to the end of his term, a number of commissions had not been delivered, and one of the appointees, William Marbury, sued Secretary of State James Madison to force him to deliver his commission as a justice of the peace.
The new chief justice, John Marshall, understood that if the Court awarded Marbury a writ of mandamus (an order to force Madison to deliver the commission) the Jefferson administration would ignore it, and thus significantly weaken the authority of the courts. On the other hand, if the Court denied the writ, it might well appear that the justices had acted out of fear. Either case would be a denial of the basic principle of the supremacy of the law.
Marshall's decision in this case has been hailed as a judicial tour de force. In essence, he declared that Madison should have delivered the commission to Marbury, but then held that the section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that gave the Supreme Court the power to issue writs of mandamus exceeded the authority allotted the Court under Article III of the Constitution, and was therefore null and void. Thus he was able to chastise the Jeffersonians and yet not create a situation in which a court order would be flouted.
The critical importance of Marbury is the assumption of several powers by the Supreme Court. One was the authority to declare acts of Congress, and by implication acts of the president, unconstitutional if they exceeded the powers granted by the Constitution. But even more important, the Court became the arbiter of the Constitution, the final authority on what the document meant. As such, the Supreme Court became in fact as well as in theory an equal partner in government, and it has played that role ever since.
The Court would not declare another act of Congress unconstitutional until 1857, and it has used that power sparingly. But through its role as arbiter of the Constitution, it has, especially in the twentieth century, been the chief agency for the expansion of individual rights. (See Part V.)For further reading: George L. Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson, Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801-1815 (1981); Donald O. Dewey, Marshall v. Jefferson: The Political Background of Marbury v. Madison (1970).
Marbury v. Madison
Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court.
At the last term on the affidavits then read and filed with the clerk, a rule was granted in this case, requiring the Secretary of State to show cause why amandamus should not issue, directing him to deliver to William Marbury his commission as a justice of the peace for the county of Washington, in the district of Columbia.
No cause has been shown, and the present motion is for a mandamus. The peculiar delicacy of this case, the novelty of some of its circumstances, and the real difficulty attending the points which occur in it, require a complete exposition of the principles on which the opinion to be given by the court is founded. . . .
In the order in which the court has viewed this subject, the following questions have been considered and decided:
1st. Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands?
2d. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy?
3d. If they do afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from this court?
The first object of inquiry is -- 1st. Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands? . . .
It [is] decidedly the opinion of the court, that when a commission has been signed by the president, the appointment is made; and that the commission is complete, when the seal of the United States has been affixed to it by the secretary of state. . . .
To withhold his commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right This brings us to the second inquiry; which is 2dly. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy?
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.
[The] government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right. . . .
By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience. To aid him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with his orders.
In such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion. The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not individual rights, and beingentrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive. . . .
But when the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other duties; when he is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts; when the rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those acts; he is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the vested rights of others.
The conclusion from this reasoning is, that where the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the President, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear, that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy. . . .
It is, then, the opinion of the Court [that Marbury has a] right to the commission; a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right, for which the laws of his country afford him a remedy.
It remains to be enquired whether,
3dly. He is entitled to the remedy for which he applies. This depends on --
1st. The nature of the writ applied for, and,
2dly. The power of this court.
1st. The nature of the writ. . . .
This, then, is a plain case for a mandamus, either to deliver the commission, or a copy of it from the record; and it only remains to be enquired,Whether it can issue from this court.
（下接中篇，待续）
Marbury v. Madison (1803)（《马伯里诉麦迪逊案》英文稿）（中）
约翰·马歇尔文 发表：选自Info USA/2001年4月；学术交流网/美国历史文献/2002年11月4日转发
Marbury v. Madison (1803)
（上接上篇）
The act to establish the judicial courts of the United States authorizes the Supreme Court "to issue writs of mandamus in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States."
The Secretary of State, being a person holding an office under the authority of the United States, is precisely within the letter of the description; and if this court is not authorized to issue a writ of mandamus to such an officerit must be because the law is unconstitutional, and therefore incapable of conferring the authority, and assigning the duties which its words purport to confer and assign.
The constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as congreess shall, from time to time,ordain and establish. This power is expressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the United States; and, consequently, in some form, may be exercised over the present case; because the right claimed is given by a law of the United States.
In the distribution of this power it is declared that "the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction."
It has been insisted, at the bar, that as the original grant of jurisdiction, to the supreme and inferior courts, is general, and the clause, assigning original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, contains no negative or restrictive words, the power remains to the legislature, to assign original jurisdiction to that court in other cases than those specified in the article which has been recited; provided those cases belong to the judicial power of the United States.
If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the legislature to apportion the judicial power between the supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to have defined the judicial power, and the tribunals in which it should be vested. The subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage, is entirely without meaning, if such is to be the construction. If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and
original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance.
Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed; and in this case, a negative or exclusive sense must be given to them or they have no operation at all.
It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and, therefore, such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.
If the solicitude of the convention, respecting our peace with foreign powers, induced a provision that the supreme court should take original jurisdiction in cases which might be supposed to affect them; yet the clause would have proceeded no further than to provide for such cases, if no further restriction on the powers of congress had been intended. That they should have appellate jurisdiction in all other cases, with such exceptions as congress might make, is no restriction; unless the words be deemed exclusive of original jurisdiction.
When an instrument organizing fundamentally a judicial system, divides it into one supreme, and so many inferior courts as the legislature may ordain and establish; then enumerates its powers, and proceeds so far to distribute them, as to define the jurisdiction of the supreme court by declaring the cases in which it shall take original jurisdiction, and that in others it shall take appellate jurisdiction; the plain import of the words seems to be, that in one class of cases its jurisdiction is original, and not appellate; in the other it is appellate, and not original. If any other construction would render the clause inoperative, that is an additional reason for rejecting such other construction, and for adhering to their obvious meaning.
To enable this court, then, to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
It has been stated at the bar that the appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of forms, and that if it be the will of the legislature that a mandamus should be used for that purpose, that will must be obeyed. This is true, yet the jurisdiction must be appellate, not original.
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper, is in effect the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and, therefore, seems not to belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction. Neither is it necessary in such a case as this, to enable the court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction.
The authority, therefore, given to the Supreme Court, by the act establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution; and it becomes necessary to enquire whether a jurisdiction, so conferred, can be exercised.
The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can become the law of the land, is a question deeply interesting to the United States; but happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest. It seems only necessary to recognize certain principles, supposed to have been long and well established, to decide it.
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future govern-ment, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it, to be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental. And as the authority from which they proceed is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to different departments their respective powers. It may either stop here, or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments.
The government of the United States is of the latter description. The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution by an ordinary act.
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature illimitable.
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently, the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.
This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is, conse-quently, to be considered, by this court, as one of the fundamental principles of our society. It is not therefore to be lost sight of in the further consideration of this subject.
（下接下篇，待续）
三、求：马伯里诉麦迪逊的案情描述及判决书
马伯里诉麦迪逊案发生于1801年初，当时美国的党争非常激烈。以亚当斯为首的联邦党与以杰弗逊为首的民主共和党之间的政治角逐白热化。在1800年底举行的总统大选中，亚当斯未获连任，杰弗逊获胜，成为美国第三任总统。在交接之前，亚当斯利用手中的权力及其由联邦党所控制的国会，对司法机构作了重大调整，提名时任亚当斯政府国务卿的联邦党的重要领导人之一的马歇尔继任首席大法官。这一提名立即获得国会批准。但是马歇尔并未立即就任，续任国务卿至换届为止。与此同时，亚当斯抓紧提名由联邦党人出任新调整的法官职位，这些新提名的法官在杰弗逊就任总统前两天获得由联邦党人控制的国会批准。。在亚当斯任职总统的最后一天，即1801年3月3日，他正式签署了42名哥伦比亚和亚历山大地区的法官的委任书，并盖了国玺。这些委任状都由国务卿马歇尔颁发给法官本人。但是由于当时的交通和通讯条件，仍有几位法官的委任状未能送出。其中一位就是马伯里。3月4日，杰弗逊就任总统任命麦迪逊为国务卿。杰弗逊对亚当斯卸任前的这些做法十分恼火，决心采取措施纠正。第一个办法就是停发尚未发出的法官委任状。
马伯里等几位已得到法官任命，但未接到委任状的人对此当然不满，因此向最高法院提起诉讼，请求最高法院对国务卿麦迪逊下达法院强制令，强制他向马伯里等人发出委任状，故此案名为马伯里诉麦迪逊案。马伯里等人的这一请求的法律依据是美国1789年9月24日通过的《司法法》第13条。它规定，美国最高法院具有受理针对美国官员的排他管辖权，可以针对美国政府官员下达强制令。
杰弗逊从宪法理论上认为最高法院无权对政府下达这种强制令。因此他提示麦迪逊拒绝出庭，拒不说明不送达委任状给马伯里等人的理由。马歇尔接到这一诉讼后感到很难办，他也知道，即使最高法院同意马伯里的请求，下达强制令，强令麦迪逊向马伯里发出法官委任状，麦迪逊也未必执行，可能导致一场宪法危机。但是马歇尔就是马歇尔，他是这样处理本案的：
马歇尔认为首先必须弄清马伯里的权利是否受到伤害，这一问题若不清楚就谈不到法律救济；如他的权利确实受到伤害，那么才有可能讨论司法救济。马歇尔对这个问题作了肯定的回答。他说：“委任状已经由总统签署，说明委任已经作出，国务卿已经在委任状上盖上了美国国玺，而得到了正式任命。法律设定了这一官职，给他任期5年的权利，并且独立于行政部门，这一任命因而是不可撤销的。马伯里的法律权利是受美国法律保护的。最高法院认为，阻碍他的任命的行为是没有法律依据的，而且是侵犯法律权利的行为。”这个分析指明了马伯里就任法官是法律赋予他的权利。
接着马歇尔又提出并回答了第二问题，这就是，如果他就任法官的权利受到侵犯，那么法律应当对他给予什么救济？他说：“公民权利的精髓在于公民受到侵害时，每个公民都有权请求法律保护。政府的第一职责也就在于给予这种保护。人们强调美国政府是法治政府，而不是人治政府。如果法律不对侵犯权利的行为给予救济，也就不再能享受这一美称了。”马歇尔对第二个问题同样做了肯定的回答，认为马伯里就任法官的权利受到了侵犯，他有权请求法律救济。法律也应当对他给予救济。
根据上述推论，马歇尔认为，马伯里有就任法官的权利，拒不向他送达委任状侵犯了他的权利。但是，是否应给予他救济完全取决于他的请求的性质。他请求下达强制令，那么法院就必须调查国务卿不给马伯里送达委任状的理由，那就涉及到行政权，行政首长的自由裁量权，谈到政治问题。马歇尔说：“法院的唯一职责是裁决个人权利，而不应调查行政部门或行政官员是如何用自由裁量权履行其职责的问题。这种问题在性质上是政治问题，根据宪法和法律应由行政部门处理，不应由法院处理。”
但是，根据《1789年司法法》第13条的规定，法院有权对任何行政官员发出强制令。按照马伯里的请求，最高法院也就应当发强制令。马歇尔认为，如果按照这一规定向麦迪逊发出强制令，则违反了美国宪法的规定。美国宪法第三条规定：“对于涉及大使、其他公使和领事的一切案件，以一州为当事人的案件，最高法院有初审管辖权。对于前述一切其他案件，最高法院有关于法律与事实的上诉管辖权。”马歇尔认为，马伯里的法律请求显属宪法所指的“其他案件”，也就是说，最高法院对此种案件只有上诉管辖权，没有初审管辖权。马歇尔说，若由最高法院直接下达强制令，命令国务卿送达委任状，等于行使了初审管辖权。
面对宪法与法律的冲突，马歇尔提出了一个极有价值的宪法问题：一部违宪的国会立法能否成为国家的法律？他认为，宪法是由人民制定的。他说：“宪法要么是优先的、最高的法律，不能以普通方法加以改变；要么宪法就如同普通立法一样，立法机关想怎么变就怎么变。此外别无他途。如果是前一种的话，立法机关所立的与宪法相违背的法就不是法律；如果是后一种的话，那么成文宪法就是荒谬的企图，对于公民来说，限制权力的企图本身就是不可限制的。”他说：“显然，制定宪法的人们都意在使宪法成为国家的根本法、最高的法，因此，任何理论的推理都必然是，立法机关制定的法律若与宪法相违背就是无效的。”他认为，这是一条最基本的原则，必须坚守。
既然违背宪法的法律无效，法官就不能适用它，那么这又必然涉及到另一个基本问题，谁有权认定什么是法律？什么是违宪的法律？马歇尔认为这一权力属于司法机关。他说：“将既定规则适用于特定案件的人必然要解释这种规则。如果两个法律相互抵触，法院必须决定适用其中哪个法律。如果一部法律是违宪的，而该法与宪法都适用于同一案件，那么法院必然要么无视宪法，适用该法，要么无视该法，适用宪法。”他认为这是司法的本质所在。显然，他认为宪法是至高无上的、是受人崇敬的，法院只能、只应当服从宪法，适用宪法，而且法官受命时是要对宪法宣誓效忠的。由此他得出结论，《1789年司法法》是违宪的，无效的，不能适用于本案，因而驳回了马伯里的请求。
这个案子虽然早已判结，但是，它的影响不但没有随着时间的消逝而消逝，反而随着时间的推移越来越深远。因遵循先例原则，这个经典的判例被引用了数百次之多，开创了司法机关审查违宪立法的先河。马歇尔在判决此案时，虽然考虑了党争的因素，但是他的判词有着实实在在的宪法理论依据，他所阐述的宪法理论思想影响了美国宪法的全部发展史。正如大法官弗兰福特在1955年所说：“自马歇尔时代开始，并且主要因为他创立的经验，在讲英语的法院里都认为马伯里诉麦迪逊判例是成文宪法的不可缺少的固有特色。”
显然，马歇尔并非就事论事地判决马伯里诉麦迪逊案，而是想通过这个判例阐明他的宪法理论，主张司法对违宪立法的审查权。马歇尔的判词之所以在美国相当普遍地为人们接受，近两百年来人们仍然信奉它，也是因为他所主张的理论比较符合美国的宪政思想，符合美国的宪法理论与实践。马歇尔之所以能创立此判例，并为人们接受，证明他的宪法理论有着美国人所认同的共同基础。美国的宪法和政治是建立在三权分立的基础之上的，三权分立、三权均衡、三权相互制约是美国宪政所追求的目标。马歇尔提出司法机关有权审查违宪的立法，正好符合这种理论目标。早在1787年宪法制定之后正式通过生效之前，以汉密尔顿为首的联邦党人就曾反复论述三权分立的理论。特别值得一提的是他还直截了当地讲到司法的违宪审查权问题。汉密尔顿说：“法院必须有权宣布违反宪法明文规定的立法为无效。如无此项规定，则一切保留特定权利与特权的条款将形同虚设。”他认为宪法规定了对立法权的限制，如没有一个机构去执行这种限制，那宪法就如同一纸空文。马歇尔在他的判词中，还举例论证说，例如宪法明文规定国会不得制定追溯既往的法律，这就是对立法权的明确限制。如果制定了追溯既往的法律则是违宪的。汉密尔顿也认为限制立法机关越权的最好机构就是法院，他认为在立法、行政、司法三大机构中，司法是最弱的一个部门，“司法部门既无军权，又无财权，不能支配社会的力量与财富，不能采取任何主动的行动。故可正确断言：司法部门既无强制，又无意志，而只有判断，而且为实施其判断亦需借助于行政部门的力量。”汉密尔顿认为，既然司法部门既无刀枪，又无金钱，对宪法造成损害的可能性最小，由它来监督宪法则最合适。他还明确地说：“宪法除其他原因外，有意使法院成为人民与立法机关的中间机构，以监督后者局限于其权力范围内行事。解释法律乃是法院的正当与特有的职责。而宪法事实上是亦应被法官看作根本大法。所以对宪法以及立法机关制定的任何法律的解释权应属于法院。如果二者间出现了不可调和的分歧，自应以效力及作用较大之法为准。亦即：宪法与法律相较，以宪法为准；人民与其代表相较，以人民的意志为准”。马歇尔的判词与汉密尔顿的言论如出一辙。汉密尔顿是公认的美国宪法之父，在制定美国宪法中作出了突出的贡献。然而不知为何，马歇尔在马伯里诉麦迪逊的判词中却丝毫没有提到汉密尔顿的名字。但无论如何，汉密尔顿的言论是对马歇尔所立判例最有力的理论支持。
马歇尔的判词与汉密尔顿的论文是美国实行司法审查的最经典的理论。汉密尔顿从理论上指出，美国要实行三权分立的宪政，三权之间的权力分配要尽可能平衡。但实际上司法部门在三权中最弱，因此可以由它行使违宪审查权。他还意识到，宪法是人民制定的，是根本大法。法律是人民选举出来的代表制定的。人民的代表必须服从人民，法律必须服从宪法，宪法是人民意志的体现。人民的代表所立之法若悖于人民制定的宪法，那么这种法律就应当是无效的。他还认为，立法权应当是有限制的，不是无限的，对立法权的这种限制也不能仅指望立法机关自己限制自己，而必须有一个机关去限制它，他认为司法机关则是行使这种限制、监督立法机关职权的合适机关。
马歇尔则从司法操作的角度论述了司法审查的必要性。简单地说，他认为，如果有两部法律同样适用于一个案件，而这两部法律的规定则是相互冲突的，法官只能择其一而适用之。问题在于择哪一个而用之。显然，马歇尔认为只能择宪法而用之，而把与宪法相冲突的国会立法弃之不顾。汉密尔顿和马歇尔都认为，司法机关要将一个具体的法律规定适用于一个具体的案件，必须涉及到对法律的解释，不解释法律，就弄不清法的含义，也就谈不到正确适用法律。显然，法官必须解释法律，并在解释法律的基础上审查法律的合宪性问题。马歇尔则直率地提出：“重要的是，司法机关的职责是说明什么是法律。”他首次明确地提出了法律解释权归司法机关的原则。应当说，马歇尔和汉密尔顿从理论和实践上讲清了司法机关审查违宪立法的必要性的可行性，奠定了司法审查的理论基础，并且基本上能为美国人所接受，也基本上适应美国的国情。正因为如此，虽然宪法没有明文规定司法审查，但在美国近两百年的实践中，司法审查成了美国宪法的一个基本原则，并在美国的政治生活中起到举足轻重的作用。
四、马伯里诉麦迪逊案的告上法院
按照规定，所有治安法官的委任状应由总统签署、国务院盖印之后送出才能正式生效。当时正是新旧总统交接之际，约翰·马歇尔一面要向新国务卿交接，一面又要准备以首席大法官的身份主持新总统的宣誓就职仪式，忙得一塌糊涂、晕头转向，结果因疏忽和忙乱，竟然还有十七份委任令在马歇尔卸任之前没能及时发送出去（马歇尔在给其弟的信中承认：“我担心种种责怪将会归咎于我”，“由于极度忙乱和瓦格纳先生[马歇尔在国务院的助手]不在”致使已经签字和盖章的法官委任状未能及时送出），而马伯里恰好身列这拨倒霉蛋之中。
对于联邦党人在权力交接前夜大搞以党划线、“突击提干”的损招儿，新上任的民主共和党总统杰弗逊早已深感不满。当听说有一些联邦党人法官委任状滞留在国务院之后，他立刻命令新任国务卿詹姆斯·麦迪逊扣押了这批委任状，并示意麦迪逊将它们“如同办公室的废纸、垃圾一样处理掉”。
接着，针对联邦党人国会在换届前夜的立法，民主共和党人控制的新国会针锋相对，以牙还牙，于1802年3月8日通过了《1802年司法条例》（judiciary act of 1802），废除了《1801年司法条例》中增设联邦巡回法院的规定，砸了16位新任联邦法官的饭碗。
不过，新国会并没有撤销任命42名治安法官的《哥伦比亚特区组织法》。为了防止联邦党人控制的最高法院挑战新国会通过的法案，国会采取重新安排最高法院开庭日期的办法，改一年两次开庭为一次开庭，使最高法院从1801年12月到1803年2月期间暂时关闭，时间长达14个月之久。当最高法院再次开庭时，已经是1803年2月了。
马伯里虽然家财万贯，但对治安法官这个七品芝麻官却情有独钟，就这样不明不白地丢失了法官职位，他觉得实在是太冤，非要讨个说法不可。于是，马伯里拉上另外三位同病相怜的难兄难弟，聘请曾任亚当斯总统内阁总检察长（attorney general，总检察长一般译为司法部长。这个职位虽然是1789年建立的，但当时只是一个非全职的内阁职位，直到威廉·怀特任职期间才成为全职位置——即使这样他仍然是光杆儿司令一个，因为司法部[Justice department]要到1870年才建立，只有到这时才可以称司法部长）的查尔斯·李（Charles Lee）为律师，一张状纸把国务卿麦迪逊告到了最高法院。他们要求最高法院下达执行令（原文为拉丁文writ of mandamus，也译训令状，在英美普通法中指有管辖权的法官对下级法院、政府官员、机构、法人或个人下达的要求其履行法定职责行为的命令），命令麦迪逊按法律程序交出委任状，以便自己能走马上任。控方律师起诉的根据源自《1789年司法条例》（the judiciary act of 1789）第13款d条中的规定：联邦最高法院在法律原则和惯例保证的案件中，有权向任何在合众国的权威下被任命的法庭或公职官员（persons holding office）下达执行令状。
麦迪逊一看对手来头不小，便来了个兵来将挡、旗鼓相当，请杰弗逊总统内阁总检察长莱维·林肯（Levi Lincoln）出任自己的辩护律师。这位林肯先生真不愧是现职总检察长，办案派头十足，接了案子以后竟然连法院都懒得去，只是写了一份书面争辩送交最高法院，声称马伯里诉麦迪逊（Marbury v. Madison）案是一个涉及党派权力斗争的政治问题，跟法律压根儿就不沾边，最高法院管不着这种根本就扯不清楚的党派斗争。
接到控方律师的起诉状和辩方律师寄来的书面争辩后，马歇尔大法官以最高法院的名义致函国务卿麦迪逊，要求他解释扣押委任状的原因。谁料想，麦迪逊对马歇尔的信函根本就不予理睬。在当时的法律和历史环境下，麦迪逊这种目中无人、无法无天的行为是件稀松平常的事，因为联邦最高法院当时实在是一个缺乏权威的司法机构。制宪先贤汉密尔顿（Alexander Hamilton）曾评论说：“司法部门既无军权，又无财权，不能支配社会力量与财富，不能采取任何主动行动”，是“分立的三权中最弱的一个”。1789年生效的美国宪法虽然规定了行政、立法、司法三权分立和制衡的格局，但这部宪法以及后来增添的宪法修正案，对于宪法最终解释权的归属问题从未做出任何明确规定。这部宪法没有赋予最高法院向最高行政当局和国家立法机构指手画脚、发号施令的特权，更别提强令总统、国务卿以及国会服从最高法院的判决了。
从宪政理论角度看，按照欧洲思想家洛克（John Locke）、孟德斯鸠（Charles Louis de Secondat Moutedquieu）、卢梭关于限权政府、分权制衡、主权在民的宪法和制度设计原则，行政权、立法权和司法权的职能和权限应当严格区分，相互独立，彼此之间“井水不犯河水”。另外，在分立的三权之中，如果一定要判定哪一权处于更优越的地位，那显然应是拥有民意基础的立法权，无论如何也轮不到非民选的司法部门占据至高无上、一锤定音的权威地位。
这样，马伯里诉麦迪逊一案实际上使马歇尔大法官陷入了一种左右为难、必输无疑的两难困境。他当然可以正式签发一项执行令，命令麦迪逊按照法律程序发出委任状。但麦迪逊有总统兼美军总司令杰弗逊撑腰，他完全可能对最高法院下达的执行令置若罔闻。既无钱又无剑的最高法院若向麦迪逊国务卿强行发号施令却又被置之不理，只会让世人笑掉大牙，进一步削弱最高法院的司法权威。可是，如果马歇尔拒绝马伯里合理的诉讼要求，那就等于主动认输，承认最高法院缺乏权威，无法挑战行政部门高官目无法纪的举动，不仅愧对同一阵营中的联邦党人战友，而且使最高法院颜面扫地。
审，还是不审，成为一个令马歇尔极为头疼的大难题。经过半个多月的苦思冥想，他终于琢磨出了一个两全其美的绝妙判决，令后人拍案称奇，赞不绝口。马歇尔的判决既表现出司法部门的独有权威，又避免与行政当局和国会迎头相撞、直接冲突，为确立司法审查（Judicial review）这个分权与制衡体制中的重要权力奠定了基石。
以上就是关于马布里诉麦迪逊案主审法官相关问题的回答。希望能帮到你，如有更多相关问题，您也可以联系我们的客服进行咨询，客服也会为您讲解更多精彩的知识和内容。
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